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Detection of 
Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Virus in 
Patients Treated 
with Oseltamivir
To the Editor: In April 2009, an 
infl uenza outbreak caused by a novel 
strain of infl uenza virus A (H1N1) was 
identifi ed in Mexico. The rapid spread 
of this new virus among humans led the 
World Health Organization to raise the 
phase of pandemic alert to 6. We report 
results from the 2 virology laboratories 
from university hospitals that were in-
volved in the surveillance network of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Paris at the 
beginning of the outbreak in France.
Patients exhibiting infl uenza-like 
illness (i.e., fever, sore throat, cough, 
asthenia, headache, myalgia) and who 
recently had traveled to countries 
where the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
outbreak had started (i.e., Mexico, 
United States, Canada, Japan) were 
hospitalized. Symptoms began either 
the day before or the day of hospital-
ization. Nasal-swab specimens were 
collected at admission by using the 
Virocult system (ELITech; Salon-
de-Provence, France), and treatment 
with oseltamivir was started (75 mg, 
2×/day). Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in-
fection was diagnosed by using rapid 
test QuickVue Infl uenza A+B (Quidel, 
San Diego, CA, USA) and real-time 
reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) 
assays from the French National In-
fl uenza Centers or the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (1). In 
the case of a positive result, infl uenza 
virus in nasal secretions from patients 
was monitored daily by RT-PCR until 
viral genomes became undetectable.
From April 24 through June 7, 
2009, nasal swab specimens from 
234 persons (132 men; median age 
of all patients 33 years) were pro-
cessed; pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infec-
tion was confi rmed for 17 men and 
15 women (median age 33 years) by 
RT-PCR. Results of the Quidel rapid 
tests were available for 27 specimens, 
with positive results for 9 (33% sen-
sitivity). However, no positive result 
was observed with the Quidel rapid 
tests among the nasal swab specimens 
with negative RT-PCR results (100% 
specifi city). Infl uenza virus detection 
in nasal secretions was monitored for 
16 patients who had laboratory-con-
fi rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infec-
tion and were treated with oseltamivir. 
Viral detection by RT-PCR was absent 
2 to >5 days after antiviral treatment 
began (Figure). Signifi cant differences 
were not found in sex and age of the 
patients (data not shown).
These preliminary virologic data 
obtained during the fi rst 6 weeks of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in France con-
fi rm the poor sensitivity of the Quidel 
test toward this new virus, as recent-
ly reported (2). Further studies are 
needed to evaluate the performances 
of other rapid tests. Hayden et al. (3) 
demonstrated that treatment with osel-
tamivir signifi cantly reduced duration 
of viral shedding among patients in-
fected with seasonal infl uenza virus A 
(H1N1), in comparison with a placebo 
group: 1.5–2.5 days vs. 3.5–5.5 days 
(p = 0.003). In our study, surprisingly, 
PCR results for sequential nasal swab 
specimens from 16 patients infected 
by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and treated 
with oseltamivir were negative within 
3 days after therapy for only 9 (56%); 
indeed, for 3 (19%) patients, viral ge-
nome could be detected >5 days after 
antiviral treatment began. These data 
raise questions about potential virus 
transmission during antiviral treat-
ment and the possible resistance of 
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 2, February 2010 351 
LETTERS
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 to oseltamivir. 
This latter point is now under study.
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Marburg Virus in 
Fruit Bat, Kenya 
To the Editor: Lake Victoria Mar-
burgvirus (MARV) causes severe hem-
orrhagic fever with a high case-fatality 
rate in humans. Index cases occurred 
in Europe during 1967 among labora-
tory workers who handled tissues and 
blood samples of nonhuman primates 
from Africa (1). Thereafter, MARV 
was reported throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa. Most outbreaks in humans 
were associated with visits to caves and 
mines (2–6). In Kenya, human cases of 
MARV infection were reported in 1980 
and 1987; these occurred after visits 
to the Kitum Cave at Mount Elgon 
(7,8). MARV was detected in tissues of 
Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus aegyp-
tiacus) and other bat species from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Gabon, and Uganda (3–6).
We collected bats from across Ke-
nya during June–July 2007 within the 
framework of the Global Disease De-
tection Program, which is dedicated to 
investigation of emerging pathogens. 
Collection protocols were approved 
by the National Museums of Kenya 
and by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (Atlanta, GA, USA). 
Blood, fecal and oral swab specimens, 
and selected tissue samples were col-
lected from bats and stored on dry ice.
For MARV detection, total RNA 
was extracted from pooled or indi-
vidual liver, spleen, and lung samples 
from 272 bats. Nested reverse tran-
scription–PCR (RT-PCR) with prim-
ers specifi c for MARV nucleoprotein 
gene was performed as described (5). 
When a band of the expected size was 
detected after electrophoresis on an 
agarose gel, the RT-PCR product was 
sequenced. Laboratory cross-contam-
ination was not a concern because no 
work with MARV had been conducted 
in the facility where the examination 
was performed.
MARV RNA was detected in 
pooled liver, spleen, and lung tissue 
of an apparently healthy, pregnant, 
352 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 2, February 2010
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 >5
Virus excretion, d
N
o.
 p
at
ie
nt
s
Figure. Duration of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 excretion in nasal swabs from patients treated 
with oseltamivir. The number of days from start of oseltamivir treatment to achievement of 
negative results of reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) is indicated for 16 patients. The 3 
patients classifi ed in the last group (>5 days) are 1 patient with a negative RT-PCR result 
on day 7 posttreatment and 2 patients who still had positive results on day 5 posttreatment 
but provided no additional sample for testing.
